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Download Advances in Dynamic Games: Applications to Economics, by Alain Haurie, Shigeo Muto, Leon A. Petrosjan, T. E. S. PDF

By Alain Haurie, Shigeo Muto, Leon A. Petrosjan, T. E. S. Raghavan

This e-book, an outgrowth of the tenth overseas Symposium on Dynamic video games, offers present advancements of the speculation of dynamic video games and its purposes. The textual content makes use of dynamic video game versions to technique and remedy difficulties concerning pursuit-evasion, advertising and marketing, finance, weather and environmental economics, source exploitation, in addition to auditing and tax evasions. It contains chapters on cooperative video games, that are more and more drawing dynamic methods to their classical solutions.

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Additional info for Advances in Dynamic Games: Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games)

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16 D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, and N. Vieille We briefly mention some basic properties of rλε . Note first that rλε ≤ r. Since ∼λ,ε,s,x is an equivalence relation, one has rλε (s, x, y) = rλε (s, x, z) whenever z ∼λ,ε,s,x y. In addition, it can be checked that, for fixed λ, ε and s, the function rλε (s, ·, ·) is continuous with respect to y and upper semi-continuous in the pair (x, y). Finally, the map (ε, λ, x, y) → rλε (s, x, y) is semi-algebraic. We now proceed to introducing a vector vλε , which will play the role of the “value” of the auxiliary discounted game.

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Absorbing games with a signaling structure, Math. Oper. , 26, 286–303, 2001. , Stochastic games without perfect monitoring, Internat. J. , 32, 17–40, 2003. , Thuijsman F. , Stochastic games with nonobservable actions, Preprint, 2000. , Stochastic games with zero stop probabilities, Contributions to the Theory of Games, 3, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957. , Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with nonobservable actions, Internat. J. , 18, 57–89, 1989. , Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information, Internat.

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